Excerpt] We begin with a brief discussion of opportunism in marketing channels and then describe three mechanisms for governing marketing channels drawn from the concepts of transaction-cost analysis and relational-exchange theory. Next, we describe an empirical test of hypotheses relating to channel governance and then discuss the results of this study, emphasizing how these governance mechanisms can be used for either preventing or constraining opportunism.
When a firm behaves opportu nistically it is seeking to increase its short-term, unilateral gains, perhaps even at the expense of its trading partner. Some such actions include hiding or misrepresenting financial results, overstating the need for trading-partner support (e.g., lowcost renovation loans), or neglecting obligations to the trading partner (e.g., hotels commitment to pro mote the brand). As a result, oppor tunism by one party can erode the long-term gains potentially accru ing to both parties in a relationship.
Because opportunism can be destructive to a business relation ship, restraining opportunism is critical to enhancing performance and to increasing partners' satisfac tion with the arrangement.1 After all, the prospect of increased gains is what motivates each party to join forces in creating a business relationship.
As noted by Stump and Heide, a number of mechanisms are available for managing opportunism among independently owned firms in a business relationship.2 Even before any contracts are signed, business operators should carefully select their partners, and they should de sign relationship agreements to discourage opportunistic behavior. Once the contract is signed, each party should monitor its partner s behavior to ensure that the partner is living up to its obligations. An other thing the partners can do after the contract is signed is to develop shared relational-exchange norms and values, which engender an atmosphere of mutual benefit, thereby mitigating opportunistic behavior.3 For example, with the shared norm of conflict harmoniza tion, the partners attempt to settle their disputes so that both parties are satisfied, as opposed to taking a "winner vs. loser" approach to re solving their disagreements. An ex treme way to attempt to ensure that a contract is upheld is for one com pany to buy the other.4 While own ership should forestall opportunistic behavior, things do not always work out that way, as we explain below.
For some time now researchers have recognized that a firm may employ a variety of mechanisms for governing transactions.5 In this re search we focus on three specific mechanisms for mitigating oppor tunism: (1) ownership, (2) invest ment in transaction-specific assets, and (3) development of relationalexchange norms. We investigated the efficacy of each of those in manag ing opportunism individually and in combination.
By identifying the most effective of those three mechanisms (whether singly or in combination), managers should gain a better understanding of which governance mechanisms to use in effectively and efficiently managing opportunism in their business relationships. One goal of such control is to contain distribu tion costs. The twin benefits of lower costs are lower prices to busi ness users and consumers and in creased profitability for the partners.
We begin with a brief discussion of opportunism in marketing chan nels and then describe three mecha nisms for governing marketing channels drawn from the concepts of transaction-cost analysis and relational-exchange theory. Next, we describe an empirical test of hypotheses relating to channel gov ernance and then discuss the results of this study, emphasizing how these governance mechanisms can be used for either preventing or constraining opportunism.
Our hypotheses are tested using relationships in the hotel industry between individual hotels and their brand headquarters. On the one hand, the corporate brand head quarters focuses on developing and maintaining the overall marketing program, including the brand iden tity. On the other hand, the manag ers at an individual hotel property may be less than assiduous in foster ing that brand identity. The chief reason we chose this setting is that hotel chains use a variety of mecha nisms to govern individual proper ties' operations. Among these mechanisms are corporate owner ship of each hotel (e.g., Red R oof Inns),franchise agreements (e.g., Holiday Inn), owning transactionspecific assets (e.g., reservation sys tems), and relational exchange (e.g., Choice Hotels' use of regional sales reps to assist its franchised hotels in developing marketing programs and in implementing company-wide marketing programs).6 6 For a fuller discussion of these and other mechanisms used to govern vertical relationships in the hotel industry, see: Chekitan S. 
Opportunistic Behavior
Much of the conceptual frame work regarding controlling oppor tunistic behavior is grounded in transaction-cost analysis. This ap proach provides a theoretical ratio nale for the operation of gover nance structures ranging from open markets (i.e., exchange among inde pendent producers and distributors) to hierarchies, where many of the factors of production and distribu tion are owned in common. Fran chising is in the midst of that range of governance structures because it shares characteristics with both markets and hierarchies.
The applicability of a particular governance mechanism depends on the relationship of the parties in volved.7 For example, the gover nance mechanisms relating to fastfood franchises are well suited to ensuring that each operator, though independent, provides a uniform market offering. By contrast, mass merchandisers that integrate the wholesaling function use hierarchies to achieve economies of scale or economies of scope. Hierarchies also allow for benchmarking the performance of independent dis tributors (e.g., comparing fran chised outlets with companyowned stores).
Opportunism refers to "a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest seeking with guile."8 One important asset that a brand headquarters risks when ho tels operate under its brand name, for instance, is the equity that it has built up in its brand. Opportunistic behavior can potentially erode the value of the brand. Such behavior can occur either before the business arrangement is established or dur ing the course of a relationship. Opportunism before the fact (i.e., adverse selection) occurs when one firm disguises its true ability to per form the functions required of the exchange. Hotel operators use due diligence to prevent this form of opportunism. Franchise systems, for instance, carefully screen potential franchisees in an attempt to sign up only those firms that are likely to maintain the hotel chain' s quality image. Franchisees, on the other hand, attempt to verify indepen dently the franchisor' s revenue and profit projections. Parties in a pro spective management agreement also make similar due-diligence efforts before they sign a hotelmanagement contract.
Opportunism can also occur once the relationship has been launched. Examples of such opportunism in clude withholding or distorting information so as to "mislead, dis tort, obfuscate, or otherwise con fuse,"9 or shirking duties, as in the case of "not delivering the promised action and resources, and failing to do this on a fairly systematic and sustained basis."10 Hotel chains pro tect themselves against franchisee opportunism in a number of ways, including attempting to establish a code of ethical operation and setting up a system of strict inspections.
Mitigating Opportunism
Following Heide, we view gover nance as "a multidimensional phe nomenon which encompasses the initiation, termination, and ongoing relationship maintenance between a set of parties."11 Governance mech anisms establish and structure ex change relationships, and, as Williamson notes, "governance structures differ in their capacities to respond effectively to disturbances [i.e., opportunism]."12 Accordingly, we examine the efficacy of three different mechanisms for mitigating opportunism in hotel-marketing channels. As we said above, those mechanisms are (1) brand head quarters' ownership of the hotel, (2) investments made by the hotel in transaction-specific assets, and (3) relational-exchange norms devel oped between the hotel and its brand headquarters.
Ownership. A central tenet of transaction-cost analysis is that in vestments in transaction-specific assets are often best safeguarded through ownership.13 Ownership enables the hotel-brand headquarters to manage its hotels' opportunistic tendencies in two ways. First, owner ship offers the potential for a richer system of reward and punishment. Second, the organizational culture shared by headquarters and its hotels provides common norms and values that (should) align their interests.14 Ownership permits a firm to em ploy extensive monitoring and sur veillance of its outlets.15 For example, brand headquarters has access to necessary records and may conduct whatever inspections and request those reports necessary to evaluate a particular hotel' s outcomes. Further more, a vertically integrated firm can use more subtle rewards with em ployees (e.g., assignments to desirable hotels) and more extensive sanctions (e.g., suspensions with or without pay) than the company can apply to independent partners.16 Most telling, ownership weakens the parties' in centive to behave opportunistically because no individual part of the company generally can make an opportunistic gain without ulti mately hurting itself (as part of the company).17
Second, under common owner ship, the brand headquarters and its hotels are more likely to share a similar organizational culture and, thus, also share a consistent set of norms and values. Through this common set of norms and values, the hotel' s objectives become more closely aligned with those of the brand headquarters. W hen the hotel' s objectives are aligned with its brand headquarters, the hotel man agers' incentive to behave opportu nistically is reduced. To act with opportunism would subvert their own goal achievement.
These two characteristics of brand headquarters' hotel ownership should lead to the same resultnamely, reduced opportunism on the part of individual hotels. There fore, our first hypothesis is that a hotel' s opportunism will be reduced where brand headquarters has full ownership of the hotel, as compared to situations where the hotel is in dependently owned.
Transaction-specific assets. Transaction-specific assets are items that have little or no value outside of the exchange relationship.18 Such assets include specialized equipment and facilities, as well as specialized training and experience.19 For ex ample, chain-affiliated hotels often invest in specific physical assets (e.g., furnishings, supplies, and signs) and idiosyncratic intangible assets (e.g., information systems, reservations
We were surprised to find that opportunism was not reduced among company-owned hotels, relative to independently owned chain properties.
Questionnaire Items for the Multi-item Construct Measures

Hotel opportunistic behavior (HOPPRT)
• W e have always provided headquarters with a completely truthful picture of our business, (reversed)* • W e always carry out the duties of our relationship even if headquarters does not check up on us. (reversed)* • W e have sometimes promised headquar ters that we would do things, even though we actually had no intention of following through.* • In terms of headquarters, we believe that it is OK to do anything within our means that will help further our hotel's interests.* • To get the necessary support from head quarters, we sometimes mask the true nature of our needs. • To get the needed support from head quarters, we sometimes overstate the difficulties our hotel faces. • In order to maintain our goals (i.e., profitability, sales revenue, or market share), we occasionally find it necessary to neglect some of our obligations to headquarters. • Regardless of its impact on our business (i.e., profitability, sales volume, or market share), we always conscientiously perform the duties of marketing this brand, (reversed)* • Sometimes we have had to alter the facts slightly in order to get what we need from headquarters.
• On occasion, my hotel has had to lie to
headquarters about certain things in order to protect our interests.
Hotel Investment in transaction-specific assets (HTSA)
• The systems and procedures we use with this brand could not be used for any other hotel brand without major changes.* • To market our services under this brand, we have had specialized training that we couldn't use with another brand.* • Our hotel has spent a lot of time and effort to develop a strong customer base for this particular brand. • The systems and procedures we use to sell hotel services are tailored for this brand.
• W e have spent a lot of time and effort learning special selling techniques for this hotel brand. • If we switched to a competitive brand, we would lose a lot of the investment we've made in marketing our services.
N ote: All scale items are anchored by " 1" (strongly disagree) or "7" (strongly agree).
Hotel's perceptions of relational exchange (HRELATE)
• W e expect our relationship with head quarters to last a long time. systems, and management proce dures) that cannot easily be used if the hotel were to transfer to another chain. Businesses invest in transactionspecific assets for at least three rea sons. One reason is that such assets are more efficient and effective than generalized assets in accomplishing business objectives. For example, by investing in particular signs or computer software and by giving employees specialized training, a hotel can appeal more effectively to its target market and operate more efficiently in serving that market. A second reason for parties to invest in transaction-specific assets is to signal their honorable intentions with re spect to their trading relationship.20 A third reason is that such invest ments may be required as a condi tion of exchange, beyond the pur poses of effectiveness and efficiency. In this instance, transaction-specific assets can be required essentially as performance bonds to be forfeited if a firm is detected as behaving opportunistically.
Common to all three motives for investing in transaction-specific assets and explicit in the performancebonding motive is the potential for economic loss. Thus, regardless of its motives for investing in transactionspecific assets, if a relationship is terminated a firm can potentially lose those assets' full value (e.g., the value of a franchisee' s building con structed on land leased from the franchisor), its nonsalvageable value (e.g., brand-specific knowledge that cannot be redeployed to other ex change relationships), and the future income stream generated by the assets (e.g., a hotel' s traffic generated by its chain' s reservation system).21
Given that a firm' s opportunistic behavior may be grounds for termi nating a business relationship, sev eral researchers have posited that the risk of forfeiting those idiosyn cratic investments restrains hotel malfeasance.22 Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows: The hotels opportunism will be reduced the more the hotel has invested in transaction-specific assets of its own.
Relational exchange. Rela tionships among firms can be char acterized by exchange norms, such as role integrity, mutuality, solidarity, flexibility, information exchange, harmonious conflict resolution, and a long-term orientation.23 Shared norms are characteristic of rela tional exchange, which is the final mechanism that we investigate for managing opportunism. Some of the common components of rela tional exchange are defined below.
Relationship preservation is the extent to which channel members: (a) view their relationship as dis tinct from a series of discrete trans actions, (b) see the relationship important in and of itself, and (c) wish to preserve that relation ship.24 Role integrity entails channel members' expectations for needed future roles and suggests that roles expand to "cover a multitude of issues not directly related to any particular transaction."25 This con tractual norm ensures the stability necessary for exchange relationships to deepen.26 The norm of harmoni zation of relational conflict refers to the extent to which channel members achieve mutually satisfying resolu tion of their conflicts.27 Because exchange norms are indicative of a construct dubbed relationalism,28 we view the extent of relational exchange in a marketing channel as the de gree to which the norms of role integrity, preservation of the rela tionship, and harmonization of rela tional conflict characterize that channel. Thus, relational exchange limits opportunism through the sharing of common norms and values. By subscribing to a relationshippreservation norm, the exchange partners see the relationship as on going and mutually beneficial, and they will, therefore, refrain from taking actions that jeopardize the relationship. In summary, the norms engendered in relational exchange provide another way that channel members safeguard themselves from opportunistic behavior.29
Based on those arguments, we hypothesize that: The hotel' s oppor tunism will be reduced the more the hotel perceives a relational ex change with its brand headquarters.
We also tested for any interac tions among the three possible methods of controlling opportun ism. That is, for example, whether ownership combined with a rela tional exchange had even more influence than ownership alone.
On Good Behavior
We tested our hypotheses by ex amining the relationship between individual hotels and their brand headquarters in two large hotel chains doing business in North America. We selected these two companies because each has both company-owned properties and franchised units. The questionnaire that we sent was pretested with a group of over 30 hotel GMs en rolled in a university executivedevelopment program. We also asked senior managers in both hotel chains to review the questions to ensure their relevance.
We surveyed hotel general man agers to gather our data, because our pretest determined that the hotel' s GM was the person within the ho tel best qualified to report on the hotel' s relationship with its brand headquarters. The two hotel chains provided names of GMs and their hotel addresses so that we could send them a questionnaire. We sent the questionnaire to 1,736 hotel general managers, but some were undeliverable or their hotels had switched brand affiliation. That left a pool of 1,650 potential respondents.
To increase the response rate, we included a cover letter in sup port of the research from the hotel company' s chief operating officer, and we assured the participants that all responses were confidential. Thus, we present only aggregate results here. We also offered each participant an executive summary of the study as an inducement to par ticipate. Finally, we sent follow-up letters to managers who did not respond within four weeks of the initial mailing. With all this, we received completed responses from 368 general managers (a response rate of 22.3 percent). We checked our sample for non response bias in two ways. First, we telephoned 50 randomly drawn nonrespondents to ask a series of descriptive questions along with a random selection of items from the questionnaire. No significant differ ences on those questions (p > 0.10) were found between the original respondents and our sample of 50 nonresponding GMs. We also noted that the profile of those who did not respond closely matched the company-wide profiles provided by the two brands' headquarters. As a separate matter, we looked at the timing of responses but could find no significant differences in the variable means between early re sponders and late responders.
Exhibit 1 Variable intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations (n=368) ------------------------------------------------------------Factors (see key below)
Measuring Opportunism
We tested opportunism (the guileful seeking of self interest) by adapting ten items developed by previous researchers who also investigated opportunism.30 For our purposes, transactionspecific assets mostly involve the intangible aspects of hotel opera tions (e.g., time and effort spent in developing a customer base for the brand; systems and procedures tai lored to the brand). Most tangible assets (e.g., furnishings, equipment, and supplies), on the other hand, can be used in other relationships. Consequently, we developed six items to measure the hotels invest ment in idiosyncratic intangible assets (see the box on page 14).31
Exhibit 2 Regression estimates for governance mechanisms on hotel opportunism
As noted earlier, we viewed the construct of relational exchange as being reflected by role integrity, preservation of the relationship, and harmonization of conflict. Accord ingly, hotel general managers were asked to rate 15 items, based on those developed by Kaufmann and Dant, for measuring these three aspects of the hotels' relationships. 32 We used several statistical tests, in cluding confirmatory factor analysis, to evaluate whether the questions were actually testing for the in tended constructs. Among other tests, we examined a goodness-offit index, a comparative-fit index, and nonnormed and normed incremental-fit indices. Values for all of these indices exceeded their generally accepted thresholds of 0.90 for adequate model fit.
All factor loadings were statisti cally significant and roughly equal in magnitude. The composite reli ability coefficient for each of these three multi-item constructs ex ceeded the 0.60 threshold necessary for measurement reliability.33 In addition, the average variance ex tracted for each construct surpasses its 0.50 threshold for adequate fit.34 The largest between-factor correla tion was -0.45, which was signifi cantly less than unity; this finding provides evidence of the discrimi nant validity of these measures.35 All of these tests give us confidence that behavioral measures are indeed reliable, unidimensional, and valid.
Ownership. We asked each hotel' s general manager to indicate on a nominal scale whether the hotel was 100-percent chain owned, 100-percent independently owned, or had shared ownership. We elimi nated the shared-ownership proper ties because there were so few of them (27 hotels). Our analysis com pared the 39 hotels that were 100percent chain owned and the 329 properties that were 100-percent independently owned.
Control variables. Since other factors might account for a substan tial amount of the variance in hotel opportunism, we included two con trol variables. Given that the sample consisted of hotels representing two different brands in the lodging in dustry, differences in the operation of these chains might affect the degree of relational norms and level of opportunism they experience. For this reason, each hotel in the sample was coded according to which chain it represented. We also wanted to control for the size of the hotel, believing that large hotels may experience different relation ships with their brand headquarters than small ones.
Analytical Procedure
We summarized our hypotheses in a regression equation. In addition to the control variables (for size and chain affiliation), the equation in cluded a dummy variable for own ership (that is, owns or doesn' t own), plus seven terms, one for each of the three main hypotheses, one for each dual combination of ownership, transaction-specific assets, and rela tionship, and one for all three of those combined. 36 We estimated this equation using the moderatedregression approach.37 We limited multicollinearity between the inter action terms and their components by centering the numerical scales for transaction-specific assets and relationships on their respective mean points. As shown in Exhibit 1, multicollinearity was low, as the largest amount of variance shared between any two variables is 22.7 percent.
Exhibit 2 reports the results of this moderated, ordinary-leastsquare regression analysis. The esti mated equation explains a relatively small 13.7 percent of the variation in hotel opportunism. Neither the size of the hotel nor its brand affilia- tion was statistically significant, so we could eliminate those factors as influencing a hotels opportunistic behavior.
Exhibit 3 Effects of governance mechanisms on opportunism
Differentiating Governance Mechanisms
All of the hypotheses focus on the relationship between hotel oppor tunism and the mechanisms used to govern the relationship between a hotel and brand headquarters. Be cause we included interaction terms to represent combinations of gover nance mechanisms, we had to un tangle those interaction effects. This is done by differentiating the regres sion equation with respect to each governance mechanism (signified by the letter d). We did this for each factor in turn, at the same time set ting the values for the other two factors at one standard deviation below the mean.38
Ownership effect. We first tested the effect of ownership, re calling in Hypothesis 1 that brand headquarters' equity in the hotel will limit the hotel' s opportunistic behavior. We therefore expected the term of the derivative of the oppor tunism factor with respect to the ownership factor to be negative. Instead, we received a positive value for this factor (expressed as dHOPPRT/dOW NS = 0.047). Thus, when brand headquarters 38Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, op. cit. owns the hotel, the hotel may be slightly more likely to behave op portunistically. This finding was not significant, however, and we con clude that, contrary to our first hy pothesis, brand headquarters' own ership of the hotel has no significant effect on hotel opportunism. R e member, though, that we assumed low levels of transaction-specific assets and relational exchange.
Special assets. We hypothesized that the more the hotel has invested in transaction-specific assets, the less likely it is to engage in opportunis tic behavior. Our procedure for testing this hypothesis was similar to that of the first hypothesis. We isolated hotel-specific assets by assuming that the hotel would be independently owned and that the extent of relational exchange be tween the hotel and its headquarters was minimal. As reported in Exhibit 3, this analysis shows that the de rivative of opportunism with re spect to transaction-specific assets (expressed as dHOPPRT/dHTSA = 0.188) is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). Contrary to our hypothesis, this outcome im plies that the more the hotel has invested in transaction-specific as sets, the more it will behave oppor tunistically. This finding indicates that somehow the hotel' s idiosyn cratic assets exacerbate its opportu nistic behavior.
Relational exchange. In con trast, we found that the use of rela tional exchange as a governance mechanism mitigates a hotel' s op portunistic tendencies. The deriva tive of opportunism with respect to the relationship returned a negative value that was significant (expressed as dHOPPRT/dHRELATE = -0.315,p < 0.01). Again, we arrived at this conclusion by assuming inde pendent hotel ownership and low levels of hotel investment in idio syncratic assets. Those results are consistent with our hypothesis re garding relational exchange.
Combining Governance Mechanisms
In examining the simultaneous ef fect of the three governance mech anisms, we follow the original premise of transaction-cost analysis in assuming that ownership is the key governance alternative to the discipline of the marketplace.39 Ac cordingly, we adjusted the equation to reflect the assumption that the hotel' s idiosyncratic investments and the extent that it perceives relational exchange with its brand headquar ters moderate the effects of brand headquarters' ownership on hotel opportunism. Because the use of transaction-specific assets as a gover nance mechanism is also rooted in transaction-cost analysis, we assume that a firm relationship moderates any linkage between opportunism and transaction-specific assets.
Ownership and assets. We found a moderate effect on oppor tunism resulting from a combina tion of a brand' s ownership of a hotel and the hotel' s investment in transaction-specific assets. The ef fect, however, was not significant, so we had to reject any hypothesis suggesting that the hotel' s invest ment in specialized assets coupled with headquarters' ownership of the hotel will reduce hotel opportunism.
Ownership and relations. We came to a similar conclusion for the hypothesis that higher degrees of relational exchange will intensify the effect of headquarters' owner ship of the hotel in lessening the hotel' s opportunistic behavior. In creasing levels of relational exchange along with brand headquarters' ownership heightened, rather than reduced, hotel opportunism. The differences among those effects were not statistically significant, however.
Assets and relationship. We also had to reject the idea that a decline in a hotel' s opportunistic behavior can be accelerated by a combination of increasing idiosyn cratic investments and a greater relational exchange with its brand headquarters. Our results were con sistent with the spirit of this hy pothesis, but we found that changes in the level of relational exchange did not affect the relationship be tween opportunism and transactionspecific assets. Similarly, a combina tion of all three factors did not have a signficantly greater effect on op portunism than did each one inde pendently. In fact, increasing both hotel asset investment and relational exchange from moderate to high levels had a significant impact on the efficacy of the ownership gover nance mechanism (p > 0.01), but in the wrong direction. That is, this combination exacerbated rather than mitigated hotel opportunism.
A Relational-exchange Perspective
Because transaction-cost analysis has played a huge role in the study of marketing-channel governance, we focused on the role of relational exchange in moderating the effects of transaction-cost governance mechanisms (that is, the effects of ownership and idiosyncratic invest ments) on opportunistic behavior.
In this section, we turn that analysis around and look at how transactioncost mechanisms moderate the im pact of relational exchange on hotel opportunism. Instead of focusing on a comparison of the derivatives of opportunism and ownership or opportunism and assets, we instead evaluate the derivative of opportun ism with respect to the relationship (dHOPPRT/dHRELATE) as that term is mitigated by the other fac tors, ownership and investment in specific assets.
We found, for instance, that ownership has a significant influ ence on the effect of relational exchange on hotel opportunism and specifically that brand owner ship reduces opportunism in the presence of a good relationship. Assuming independent hotel own ership, the effect of increasing in vestment in specialized assets is to increase the influence of relational exchange in supressing opportun ism (p < 0.01).
Ostensibly, our investigation of the impact of the simultaneous use of these governance mechanisms produced contradictory findings. Some of our results were supportive of the hypotheses, while others were not. Although an analysis us ing the transaction-cost approach generally did not support the hy potheses, application of a relationalexchange perspective did. Where relational exchange is emphasized (either singly or in combination with idiosyncratic investments), hotel opportunism decreases. Where either ownership or investments in specialized assets are stressed, hotel opportunism increases. We explore possible reasons for these results in the following section.
Managerial Implications
The strongest finding coming from this analysis is that a chain' s manag ers should focus their efforts on building an effective relationship with the GMs of their affiliated hotels. A strong relationship is the only governance mechanism (whether by itself or in combination with others) that placed any signifi cant limitation on hotel opportun ism among hotels in our sample. On the other hand, simply owning the hotel has no significant effect on its opportunistic actions, even when combined with the other governing mechanisms. Contrary to the predictions of transaction-cost theory, we found that a hotel' s op portunism can actually increase as its investment in specialized assets also increases.
Those results suggest that if brand headquarters aggressively exerts its rights of ownership, it could well exacerbate opportunism. One ex planation for this is that ownership pressure and sanctions may provoke the hotels' general managers into exerting their independence-thus "producing the very behavior they [the sanctions] were intended to discourage."40 Examples might be concealing important information, communicating invalid or mislead ing information, or intentionally neglecting agreed-upon duties.41 Moreover, the extrinsic rewards available through hotel ownership may crowd out the hotel manager' s intrinsic motivation to be a team player, especially where norms of relational exchange are prevalent.42
This may shift the hotel GM' s per spective of brand headquarters from an orientation based on a mutual relationship to one involving calcu lation, making opportunism more likely if the GM sees an advantage in behaving with guile.
In contrast, the emphasis of rela tional exchange rests on building common norms and values. A strong relationship leads to a sense of identification between the hotel and its brand headquarters. The hotel manager believes that what ever harms brand headquarters damages the hotel, and vice versa. Our data showed that this effect persists even when relational ex change is used in conjunction with ownership or investment in special ized assets (strategies that don't work by themselves). Thus, it seems that top management should em phasize building strong relationships to reduce opportunistic behavior at affiliated hotels.
Relations over Transactions
The finding that brand headquar ters' ownership of the hotel does little to limit the hotel' s oppor tunism is not consistent with transaction-cost theory. The same can be said for our results regarding investments in transaction-specific assets. Again, traditional operational arguments for these investments (i.e., they are made for the purposes of efficient and effective operation) appear to outweigh transaction-cost arguments. One interpretation of the positive link between a hotel' s investment in specialized assets and opportunism is that opportunistic behavior is one way in which the hotel can generate additional re turns on such investments.
As we have already mentioned, hotel chains have motives other than mere governance for owning hotels and for having franchisees invest in such transaction-specific resources as reservation systems-and thus they may not regard such assets as governance mechanisms. Those motives include the opera tional consistency gained by owner ship in fostering the hotel' s critical role of maintaining and reinforcing the brand s image. However, because our sample comprised companyowned and franchised hotels from only two large hotel firms, addi tional research is needed to test the boundaries of our findings.
Another possible explanation for the failure of idiosyncratic assets as a control mechanism is that the hotel chains may have done a poor job of using those assets in governance. When monitoring or punishments are ineffectual, the threat of eco nomic losses rooted in the hotel' s asset investment has a limited ability to mitigate opportunism. Further research is needed to investigate the effectiveness with which brand headquarters monitors its hotels and sanctions them for opportunistic behavior.
Another matter of concern is that our regression equation explained less than 20 percent of the variation in hotel opportunistic behavior. Indeed, that may be a source of what appears to be backward results. A confounding variable could be missing from the equation-one that might change the influence of, say, transaction-specific assets on opportunistic behavior. This out come suggests that we have omitted a number of constructs that might explain such behavior. Therefore, we recommend that future studies of opportunism include constructs such as fairness,43 conflict,44 exchange-partner replaceability,45 and exchange-partner investment in idiosyncratic assets. 46 Our study contributes to the literature on marketing-channel governance in several key ways. One contribution is in the exami nation of whether the governance mechanisms interact. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the interaction-or lack thereof-among these governance mechanisms. More important, our results emphasize the effectiveness of relational exchange as a "stand alone" mechanism for limiting op portunism. This finding reinforces the research of Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer, who found commit ment to be a critical factor in limit ing opportunism.47
Finally, our results reveal that relational exchange plays a central role in the operation of ownership and asset investment as governance mechanisms. The most effective governance mechanisms that we uncovered were the combination of ownership with relational exchange and asset investment with relational exchange.
Perhaps the most intriguing outcome is that the mechanisms for governance described in transaction-cost analysis seem to be effective for hotels only in the context of relational exchange. That is a departure from much of the channel-governance literature. This result leads us to suggest that the extent of relational exchange between channel partners is an important factor that must be con sidered before offering prescriptions based purely on transaction-cost analysis. CQ
